AS EUROPE FACES WAR, IS THE UK’S MILITARY INFLUENCE WANING? CONFLICT HAS BROKEN OUT IN UKRAINE AND, WHILE NATO AND THE UK WILL NOT FIGHT, IT HAS RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EXTENT OF BRITISH

MILITARY INFLUENCE IN THE REGION The Russian invasion of Ukraine began during the night of 24 February, with Vladimir Putin ordering strikes against targets across the country. The attacks

comes eight years after Russian forces annexed Crimea – an incident that Boris Johnson appeared to blame on European Union actions. Mayor of London at the time of the annexation, Johnson

said: “If you want an example of EU foreign policy-making on the hoof and the EU’s pretensions to running a defence policy that have caused real trouble, then look at what has happened in

that “nothing is off the table”. The conflict does however raise questions about the UK’s standing in the world post-Brexit, and the influence the British Government has on international

affairs. Brexit was sold on the promise that it would lead to a ‘Global Britain’ and increase the country’s standing on the world stage. However, given the Government’s recent cuts to

defence and to soft power spending such as international aid, many feel the UK’s place has been diminished, not strengthened. GLOBAL BRITAINORLONELY BRITAIN? Indeed, as the _Byline

Intelligence Team_ has reported, the recent cuts to international aid took funding to Ukraine from just shy of £29 million in 2019/20 to £0 today.  Questions too have been asked about the

UK’s defence strategy, its military capability, and is preparedness for war, with inevitable comparisons to a conflict 40 years ago: the Falklands War. From the very start of this crisis,

comparisons have been made in the UK to the war in the South Atlantic. Many critics of the 1982 intervention saw the Falklands conflict as a way for Margaret Thatcher to boost her waning

popularity ahead of the election the following year. Similarly, some have argued that the Government’s response to tensions has helped shift attention away from ‘partygate’ and other

embarrassing questions for Boris Johnson.  But what is Britain’s military position in 2022, compared to 1982? _Byline Times_ dug into the data to find out. ------------------------- FEWER

TROOPS, LESS MONEY Back in 1982, the Government spent 5.28% of GDP (gross national product) on defence, with a total strength of UK regular personnel at 326.20 thousand. The cost per

personnel was £118,639 and the number of armed forces personnel per 100,000 of the population was 574. The main conflicts involving British armed forces were the Falklands and Northern

Ireland.  By 2011, the numbers had decreased significantly. By this point, defence as a percentage of GDP was 2.98% and the total strength of the armed forces was 186.4 thousand. Cost had

obviously increased with inflation, to £219,528 per personnel, but the number of armed forces personnel per 100,000 of the population had gone down to 298.  British forces were chiefly

engaged in Afghanistan during this period. Since 2009, numbers of armed forces personnel have decreased by 36,000, and by October 2021 there were 149,540 personnel in the UK regular forces.

The percentage of GDP spent on defence hovers around 2%, as per the NATO target. The UK is one of 11 NATO countries that spends more than 2% of GDP on defence – the highest is the US, which

spends just under 4%. Russia spends more than 5% of its GDP on defence. The army is already the smallest it has been for 400 years, when last spring, the Government announced plans to reduce

it further. The size of the army will be cut to 72,500 troops by 2025, with the budget focused instead on drones and cyber warfare.  In 2018, Rear Admiral Alex Burton told the BBC that

budget cuts to the armed forces, fuelled by the Conservative’s austerity policy, risked Britain losing its status as a “credible military power”. At the time, defence was facing possible

budget shortfalls over the next decade of £20 billion. FUND MORE INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING Help expose the big scandals of our era. ------------------------- THE RIGHT STUFF By the end of the

1980s – the decade the British Navy sailed down to the South Atlantic to fight for the Falklands – the UK had two aircraft carriers, seven amphibious ships, 13 destroyers and 35 frigates. By

2012, that number included no aircraft carriers. Instead, the Navy relied on helicopter carriers and 18 active major surface combatants, consisting of five destroyers and 13 frigates. That

has changed since – the UK now has two aircraft carriers which controversially cost billions of pounds. As of 1 April 2019, the UK Royal Navy’s fleet stood at a total of 83 vessels, split

between the surface fleet of 73 ships and boats, and an underwater force of 10 submarines. As for the army: a 2021 report by the Defence Select Committee criticised the recent history of the

British Army’s armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) capability as “deplorable” and characterised by “increasing obsolescence and decreasing numbers”. In 1990, the UK had around 1,200 main battle

tanks in its inventory. By 2021, that number had gone down to 227, most in need of modernisation.  The report authors warned that “were the British Army to have to fight a peer adversary –

a euphemism for Russia – in eastern Europe in the next few years, while our soldiers would undoubtedly remain amongst the finest in the world, they would, disgracefully, be forced to go into

battle in a combination of obsolescent or even obsolete armoured vehicles, most of them at least 30 years old or more”. In 2020, the UK’s tank fleet included 227 Challenger 2s, the UK’s

main battle tank, and 181 Scimitars, which is a light tank. Part of the reduction is due to a shift to different kinds of warfare – for example an increased reliance on lighter weight armed

vehicles, as well as cyber and drone warfare. A 2013 report by the charity Action on Armed Violence explained how, despite tank numbers decreasing since the end of the Cold War, the “allure

of the tank still exists” and that they pose an ethical dilemma in contributing to civilian casualties in conflict zones.