As the weeks of the Covid-19 crisis creep by, there is growing evidence of some kind of economic recovery. But there are just as many signs that there will be a grim hangover, especially

when it comes to the state of global governance and diplomacy. In truth, perhaps we have been beset by this huge contradiction since the 2008 global financial crisis, or even before. But

just as the disparate forces in the Group of 20 countries (G20) managed to come together to help pull the world economy out of that mess, this time, if anything, these forces are going the

other way. Whether it be a refinancing of the IMF’s financial resources, or a collective approach to Covid-19 treatment, therapeutics and vaccine production and distribution, the G20 is

officials actually thought seriously about this? Let me give some basic GDP maths, as it seems still that many either have no idea, or don’t care. In the decade from 2010-2019, real GDP rose

by around 3.7 per cent globally, a growth rate that was reasonably similar to the previous decade, and above the 3.3 per cent of the 1980s and 1990s. It often seemed, even pre Covid-19,

that very few observers in western capitals realised this fact. Within this overall 3.7 per cent global growth, the US averaged around 2.2 per cent, the Euro Area around 1.3 per cent and

Japan just above 1 per cent. As a result, the G7 countries — the group of leading advanced democratic nations — grew by around 1.7 per cent, less than half the world growth rate. So-called

Emerging Markets grew by around 5.5 per cent, and within this broad category, the so-called BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India and China, grew by 6.2 per cent, with each of China and

India growing close to 7.5 per cent. Without these two countries, world GDP growth would have been much weaker, something closer to the G7 country average. Indeed, if you took the next

largest democracies — India, Australia and South Korea — and added them to the current G7 countries, such a group would have averaged around 2.2 per cent, the same as the US. In effect,

these three would collectively offset the economic weakness of the Euro Area and Japan. China’s influence is huge. Its growth performance during the last decade is similar to that of India,

but China’s economy is at least five times bigger. At the same growth rate for the next three years, China would create another India. For the past decade, on most measures, China’s

contribution to global GDP comfortably exceeds that of the US. So do we really want to have a world where democratic real GDP is all “we” want. Can we only accept growth from other nations

if they behave exactly like us? Most G7 countries have benefited to differing degrees from China’s growth. Without China, their generally weak growth performances would be even weaker (this

is perhaps especially true for the exporters, Germany and Japan notably.) In this regard, it is interesting to see their own sharp slowdowns in 2019, which perhaps owed much to China’s

slowing. This might also explain why their political leaders seem to be less noisy about steps to restrict their own trade engagement with China. Now it might well be that we are going

through a period where our western leaders want to believe that there is more to life than GDP, as is occasionally said. But questions of security and the value of democracy can’t be

isolated from issues of economic growth. Is it in our interests to inhibit Chinese growth, especially as it clearly benefits the rest of us? And if so, what do we think are the consequences?

Perhaps it would be better to allow Chinese citizens themselves to judge and influence the relative merits of security, democracy and economic growth, as ultimately it is their behaviour

that will determine the path of Chinese decision making.