SHOULD DRUG CARTELS BE LABELLED TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS? Amid the general tumult of the second Trump administration, one pronouncement has gone relatively unnoticed: the designation of

several drug cartels as terrorist organisations. This accompanies an apparent elevation in their stature as a national security threat. In the US Director of National Intelligence (DNI)

Annual Threat Assessment, drug cartels were labelled as the foremost threat to US national security. In doing so it has resurrected a long-standing debate on the appropriateness of

designating purely criminal organisations as terrorists. This debate extends beyond semantics, terrorist designations can have serious ramifications for security policy for the US and the

motivated violence against noncombatant targets”, while the United Nations emphasises “acts intended to cause fear for political ends”. The terrorism scholar Bruce Hoffman argues that

terrorism is a strategy used by non-state actors to instil fear and influence political outcomes. They and others all seem to agree that terrorism is defined by three critical components:

violence, indiscriminate targeting (or against non-combatants), and the aim to create political outcomes. Terrorism is also recognised as an act of communication or “propaganda of the deed”.

The act itself is designed to create an effect wider than the offence against the original victims. Terrorism campaigns also utilise propaganda for recruitment of soldiers and to win hearts

and minds. Based on this definition, there are significant similarities to work in favour of labelling organisations like drug cartels as terrorist organisations. DRUG CARTELS AS TERRORISTS

Violence has been a consistent staple of the drug trade, and in the past has reached savage extremes akin to war. In Colombia during the 1980s and 90s, “The Extraditables” – a coalition of

drug traffickers dominated by Pablo Escobar — waged war against the state to coerce it to rescind an extradition agreement with the US that would see them deported to US jails (where they

could expect harsher treatment than in their home country). Throughout the campaign they employed many of the tactics recognised as emblematic of modern terrorism, including kidnappings,

assassinations and indiscriminate bombing, including of aircraft, that could kill tens or even hundreds at a time. This led to the coining of the term “narcoterrorism”: attempts of narcotics

traffickers to influence the policies of a government or a society through violence and to hinder the enforcement of anti-drug laws by the systematic threat or use of such violence. The

violent campaigns of Escobar and his ilk played a significant role in their downfall, and consequently modern groups have tended to avoid direct wars with the state. However, their violence

– while perhaps more targeted – remains just as systematic and aims to achieve the same psychological impact beyond the initial victims. The now splintered Los Zetas cartel became infamous

for its “ISIS-style” performative hyper-violence, even before ISIS existed. So much so that Business Insider suggested that ISIS ”[was] pulling straight from the playbook of Mexican drug

cartels”. This violence is also clearly planned and part of the overall systems of these organisations rather than a random consequence. In the Mexican state of Jalisco, a recently uncovered

“extermination “extermination site”, alleged to belong to the Jalisco New Generation cartel demonstrates its ruthlessly methodical nature. Like terrorist groups, modern cartels also seek to

exploit communication as part of their system. Daesh (aka ISIS and Islamic State) has been regarded as a pioneer in using information technologies to expand its influence; rejecting the

long lectures to camera typical of Al Qaeda in favour of slick “Hollywood production” style videos that capture both murders (to scare the West), and softer ‘life in the Caliphate’ content

(for recruitment). But cartels were using social media before terrorist groups to broadcast atrocity propaganda to induce fear and hearts and minds content to recruit new members with

promises of wealth and power. Both forms of content further work to build a protective wall of silence among locals. According to some studies, both types of organisations learn and operate

in the same manner.  In From Pablo to Osama, Michael Kenney illustrates how drug cartels and terrorist organisations share operational similarities in adaptation, structure, and resilience.

Both employ decentralised “wheel” networks with central hubs directing peripheral nodes, and “chain” networks where autonomous cells coordinate tasks without oversight. These structures

enhance flexibility and compartmentalisation, limiting information flow to reduce vulnerability. There is also a significant amount of cross pollination as part of the “crime-terror nexus”

that means some figures can be both members of designated terrorist organisations as well as operatives of cartels. Yet despite these similarities, there are more persuasive arguments for

not labelling cartels as terrorist groups. “POLITICAL OUTCOMES” The biggest definitional issue lies in that cartels miss the critical component that most legal definitions apply to

terrorism:  that they are groups seeking “political outcomes”. Although cartels have sought to influence political processes such as extradition in the past, it has not been their defining

characteristic. Cartels are defined by the short-term pursuit of wealth rather than seeking a lasting legacy or regional change that will continue after their deaths. By contrast, terrorist

groups are defined by their use of violence to pursue long-term goals or systemic change. And while some engage in criminal activity, including the drug trade, it is as a method of financing

a political movement rather than solely for personal enrichment. But beyond definitions, the real “political outcomes” that should interest policymakers are those that would occur from

designating drug cartels as terrorist organisations. This brings us to the critical argument for why such a designation is misguided: the cost-benefit analysis demonstrates it is simply not

worth it. Many of the cartels listed by the Trump administration are already designated as Transnational Criminal Organisations, or fall under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act.

Consequently, they operate under the same surveillance laws, financial restrictions and legal consequences placed on terrorist groups, as well as providing the same operational options. A

designation as a terrorist organisation would not significantly increase policy leverage beyond what existing legislation offers. Even the claimed benefit of using the terrorist label to

enable special operations against drug cartels is misleading. The U.S. already has the capability to carry out such missions, but chooses not to, largely to avoid straining relations with

neighbouring countries and causing an international backlash. Beyond this, the justification the designation would provide for a “limited military intervention” in Mexico would almost

certainly not go as planned or disrupt the flow of drugs. Terrorist designations for drug cartels would also make “financially supporting” them punishable by harsher penalties. This would

create significant ripple effects. Individual drug users would now technically become financiers of terrorism, significantly extending potential prison sentences and the consequences on

individuals and their families once they conclude their sentences. This could even include those wearing mock drug cartel merchandise, which would now be considered “circumstantial evidence

of supporting a terrorist organisation” under the Patriot Act. Considering the numbers of people held for “suspicious tattoos” and the cartels’ habit of integrating their own trademarks with

existing popular brands, it is likely this would cause an even greater number of errors that would waste law enforcement’s valuable time. Although there is understandable debate as to

whether this material glorifies criminals and their exploits, no one yet has suggested it deserves a prison sentence. Drug cartels are also deeply embedded in legitimate economic structures,

particularly in sectors like agriculture, mining, and real estate. For example, in Mexico, cartels launder money through avocado exports and cattle ranching, blurring the lines between

legal and illegal enterprise. Designating such groups as terrorists could trigger sanctions or financial restrictions that inadvertently impact legal businesses, international trade, and

foreign investment. This could destabilise local economies and deter multinational companies from operating in affected regions. Rather than weakening cartels, such disruption might harm

livelihoods and push more people toward illicit networks.   MORE HARM THAN GOOD To conclude, although the similarities between drug cartels and terrorist organisations makes it tempting to

designate them as one and the same, it creates a plethora of issues that would place even more strain on already stretched government and international resources, while producing little to

no tangible benefit. While drug cartels are undeniably a threat to national and international security, it is better to reinforce existing laws and continue to expand international and

regional efforts to contain and disrupt these organisations, which in some cases have produced notable successes, than resort to blanket designations that do more harm than good. A MESSAGE

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