The fate of the Aquarius, a Doctors without Borders rescue ship left stranded for hours in the Mediterranean carrying 629 African migrants, is a stark reminder of the EU’s ongoing stalemate

on asylum policy. The new Italian interior minister, Matteo Salvini, ordered ports to refuse docking to the ship, prompting a rhetorical revolt by several Italian mayors. Malta also refused

docking, claiming that the rescue occurred in the Italian search and rescue zone. As the ship’s supplies were running out, Spain’s new prime minister, Pedro Sanchez, stepped up to the plate

and authorised docking in Valencia. The ducking of responsibility highlights the perilous state of the EU’s Common European Asylum System, set out in article 78 of the Treaty on the

three fundamental, and interrelated, challenges. First, the equitable allocation of responsibility for assessing asylum claims and providing protection under EU law. Second, the

harmonisation and standardisation of how these decisions are made. And third, freedom of movement of “beneficiaries of international protection” namely, those entitled to refugee or

subsidiary protection status. The default position, subject to humanitarian exceptions, under what has become known as the “Dublin III” regulation – is that the first EU member state whose

border an asylum seeker has “irregularly” crossed is responsible for processing their asylum claim and providing them with reception conditions. They are then responsible to host those who

are recognised as “beneficiaries of international protection”. Notably, under Dublin III, the obligation rests on the member state, not the asylum seekers. Some asylum seekers may wish

instead to join relatives or friends in another country, or to reach a country with a welcoming – and functioning – asylum system. Dublin III has disproportionately affected “frontier”

member states, particularly Greece and Italy. But it also creates a perverse incentive for a member state not to recognise asylum seekers, given that after being recognised, they are then

unable to move freely between member states. For this reason, I have previously advocated for the creation of an “EU protection space” where beneficiaries of international protection can

exercise mobility rights. EMERGENCY RELOCATION, GLACIAL PACE Following the “emergency situation” in 2015, which to borrow the EU’s treaty language was “characterised by a sudden inflow” of

“third country nationals”, in September 2015, the European Council adopted two decisions – 2015/1523 and 2015/1601 – mandating relocation of asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to other

member states based on quotas. Hungary, which was originally supposed to benefit from such relocation as well, refused to co-operate with the scheme. Relocation – which is different to

resettlement – was intended for asylum seekers already in the EU. The way the scheme was designed meant that it was mainly Syrians, Eritreans, or Somalis who were eligible for relocation.

The quota of people each member state was allocated was calculated using a formula. This was weighted 40% on its population, 40% on its GDP, 10% on the number of asylum seekers it already

hosted, and 10% on its unemployment level. ------------------------- _ READ MORE: NAMED AND SHAMED: EU COUNTRIES ARE FAILING TO SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFUGEES _ -------------------------

Article 80 of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty stipulates that EU policy shall be “governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility”. Nevertheless, the emergency relocation

scheme faced resistance from the Visegrad group of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia. This forced the commission to initiate infringement proceedings against the Czech Republic,

Hungary, and Poland. Its March 2018 report noted that, two and half years since the scheme began, 34,000 people have been relocated. It also called on all member states to “consider

continuing relocations on a voluntary basis, beyond the emergency relocation schemes” which have now concluded. WHERE NEXT In its May 2018 progress report on the implementation of the

European Agenda on Migration, the European Commission noted that, after a peak of over 1.2m applications per year in 2015 and 2016, the 28 EU member states saw less than 0.7m applications in

2017. There are still proposals on the table for how to reform Dublin III. In a November 2017 report, the European Parliament advocated a radical overhaul of the Dublin rules, based on

automatic asylum seeker allocation criteria. This would be based on the GDP of a member state, as well as humanitarian grounds (family, cultural or social ties), language skills, and

professional skills. However, the ambition of the EU’s institutions to reform the rules appears a far cry from that of many of its members. No agreement on a way forward was reached at the

meeting in early June where EU interior ministers discussed a compromise proposal to tweak some of the existing exceptions to the first EU country of entry rule. The Bulgarian minister of

interior described “a frank discussion on fundamental aspects of the asylum reform”. But with Cyrpus, Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain critical of the limited nature of the proposed reforms,

and the Visegrad group states in opposition to mandatory relocation, the EU remains in stalemate over a way forward. The Aquarius confrontation suggests that the best that can be expected

from the June 28-29 European Council summit is a fudge. In July, Austria’s chancellor, Sebastian Kurz, takes the reins of the rotating presidency of the EU Council. Given his rhetoric, a

European “right to asylum” – set out in Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – seems to be sailing away.