The general election that took place on June 7 was no doubt one of the most critical in modern Turkish history. For a significant part of the electorate, the election represented a chance to

put a stop to the increasingly authoritarian, religiously conservative, and unabashedly neo-liberal grip of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) over the country. At stake was the future

of Turkey as a liberal democracy. Of particular concern was the prospect of the AKP securing enough seats in the parliament to be able to push for a constitutional change that would bestow

President Tayyip Erdoğan with a more powerful executive presidency. The results are not good news for the AKP. They may have received the largest share of the votes — 40.85% — but they

first-ever general election it participated in, the AKP got 34% of the popular vote and became the first party to govern Turkey without a coalition since 1991. This was a huge success for a

party that had been founded just over a year before as a democratic, conservative but non-confessional challenge to establishment Turkish politics. The party’s electoral success continued in

the 2007 general election (46.6% of the popular vote) and in 2011 (almost 50%). In August 2014, in the first-ever direct election of the Turkish president, Erdogan, the leader of the AKP,

won with almost 52%. The electoral popularity of the AKP was unprecedented but not all that surprising to those who follow Turkish politics closely. The 1990s in Turkey — often referred to

as the “lost decade” — were defined by poor economic performance and unstable coalition governments. Into this dispiriting situation, the AKP emerged not as an Islamist but a center-right

party eager to carry on a reformist, democratic, pro-growth policy agenda. In a relatively short amount of time, the party managed to build a wide coalition of supporters from citizens who

had grown estranged from the inward-looking, pro-military and nationalist policies that had dominated Turkish politics for so long. Political and economic developments of the years following

the AKP’s coming to power only enhanced their popularity. The real gross domestic product (GDP) of Turkey (or GDP at constant prices) rose by 64% between 2002 and 2012, and real GDP per

capita by 43%. During the first few years of its government, the party seemed to be enthusiastically promoting Turkey’s bid for EU accession. Turkey had applied for a membership in the

European Community back in 1987 and – after many years of lobbying – was finally granted candidacy in 1999. Ever since its foundation, Turkish political elites had wanted to position Turkey

as a part of Europe: the AKP’s dynamic involvement in this process was widely welcome. The political power of the military, whose intervention in parliamentary and executive affairs had been

a mainstay of Turkish politics (there were three military coups between 1960 and 1980), was being curtailed. And although it later proved to be a rather inept plan lacking specificity and

real effort, talks of a “Kurdish opening” gave hope to Kurdish citizens and liberal segments of the electorate that the long-festering sore of Kurdish insurgency in the east of the country

would finally be addressed. The AKP also rolled out a set of popular social policies. It extended the level of free medical services for the poor. It also provided cash transfers for the

poor, single women, and the disabled. Abroad, Prime Minister and then President Tayyip Erdogan was embraced as the architect of a new Turkey that set an example for the larger Middle East

with its success in combining Islam, democracy and a thriving free-market economy. THE AUTHORITARIAN TURN In the past few years especially, however, the AKP and its captain Erdogan – now the

president of Turkey, residing in a 1,100-room presidential palace which cost over US$600 million to build – openly embraced a more narrow view of democracy. Erdogan appeared to think that

having the support of 50% of the electorate gave him and his party the mandate to push ahead with an increasingly conservative agenda. Moreover, this electoral authoritarianism has taken on

a noticeably Islamic character. From launching education reforms meant to raise “pious generations” to the active promotion of traditional family-based lifestyles, from placing restrictions

on alcohol consumption to advocating for a ban on abortions, AKP and Erdogan made it clear that they meant business when it came to legislating their religious values. According to a Freedom

House report, as of 2014 Turkey had already become a case of “modern authoritarianism.” If the rulers in a traditional authoritarian system openly and violently suppress freedoms, the

rulers of the modern authoritarianism, the report notes, use more subtle, but ultimately more effective techniques: > “Central to modern authoritarian strategy is the capture of > 

institutions that undergird political pluralism. The goal is to > dominate not only the executive and legislative branches, but also > the media, the judiciary, civil society, the 

economy, and the > security force.” Indeed, as the report notes, under the AKP government, the past few years saw a notable intensification of these techniques, including: > “jailing 

reporters (Turkey leads the world in the number of > imprisoned journalists), pressuring independent publishers to sell > their holdings to government cronies, and threatening media 

owners > with reprisals if critical journalists are not silenced.” THE CITY PARK THAT PROVED A LIGHTENING ROD In June 2013, the government cracked down on what started as a peaceful

protest by mostly well-educated, non-political, middle-class youth against plans to erect yet another shopping mall in one of the few remaining green areas in Istanbul. The attempt to

protect Gezi Park was initially a popular reaction to the juggernaut of a construction boom that rarely consulted local residents. Once the police used disproportionate force to clear out

the protestors, opposition spread. If people had initially gone to Taksim Square to protect the people’s park against privatization, they stayed to show the government what a people’s

democracy looks like. The government dismissed the protests as the work of an international and national conspiracy backed by the financial lobby, the US and Israel. An estimated 2.5 million

citizens participated in the protests. The Gezi protests tarnished the legitimacy of Erdogan’s government, and things were only made worse for the AKP by the corruption scandal involving

the sons of three cabinet ministers and several businessmen, as well as Erdogan himself and his son. Against this backdrop, the results of the recent election should not come as a big

surprise. But the vote was not just a negative verdict on the AKP; it was also a positive boost for the opposition parties. THE SUCCESS OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES The 2015 general election

has ended the single party rule of the AKP and put the opposition parties at the center of the Turkish politics. Most significantly, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP - founded in 2012),

representing a coalition of Kurdish voters and left-wing liberals, entered parliament for the first time with 13% of the votes and 80 seats. Their campaign emphasized pluralism and the

rights of minorities and oppressed groups. Erdogan’s attempts to denigrate the HDP by calling it a party of gays and atheists failed. The country’s oldest party, the Republican People’s

Party (CHP), won 25% and 132 seats. More importantly, perhaps, the CHP played a skillful role in the campaign by respectfully engaging with the HDP during the campaign and signaled its

support for HDP’s passing the electoral threshold. By all signs, the CHP is undergoing a significant transformation. The battle between the more pro-military, exclusively secular, and

nationalistic wing of the party and the more liberal and pluralist side seems to have tilted in favor of the latter. During its campaign, the party highlighted social justice issues such as

poverty and debt and quit its dogmatic stance on a variety of religious and ethnic issues. It also began to show interest in engaging Washington in policy conversations. WHAT LIES AHEAD?

Turkey may still be AKP land, with the party having won the largest share of votes in 59 Turkish cities, but if one looks at the parliament, it is a different, much more variegated picture.

There are many challenges ahead. What would a coalition government look like? Opposition leaders have not shown a willingness to enter a coalition with the AKP. Indeed, the leader of the MHP

has already called for holding early elections. Yet, there is so much to be hopeful about. The election results ended one-party rule and put an end to Erdogan’s bid for absolute power. The

HDP’s entering parliament is particularly meaningful. During the campaign, the HDP gave voice not only to Kurds, but also to gays and women: 40% of the new HDP members of parliament are

women. The results are also important for the future of Turkey’s foreign relations. A politically stable Turkey is critical to regional stability. Over the past few years, observers from the

US and EU have raised concerns regarding the increasing tide of authoritarianism and threat to civil liberties. The actions of the Turkish government at home undermined its democratic

credentials abroad. Indeed, the Turkish government’s religious agenda was believed to have spilled over to its foreign policy. This view solidified particularly after the Syrian crisis,

leading to questions about the “Sunnification” of Turkish foreign policy. A more democratic rule, and a political leader who is open to dialogue and committed to a secular foreign policy,

will benefit not only the citizens of Turkey, but also allies of the country in building coalitions to tackle the ever more challenging situation in the Middle East.